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The Implications of the Good Friday Agreement for UK Human-Rights Reform  
 
CRG Murray, Aoife O’Donoghue and Ben TC Warwick* 
 
Abstract 
 
Speculation is rife as to the impact of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement upon the 
Conservative Government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998. In the face of 
this speculation, the UK’s Conservative Government has provided little detail as to how 
UK human-rights reform will address the requirement for incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Northern Ireland settlement. We therefore analyse 
the Agreement as both an international treaty and peace agreement and evaluate its 
interrelationship with the Human Rights Act and the Devolution Acts. Once the 
hyperbole surrounding the Agreement and its attendant domestic legislation is stripped 
away, the effects of the 1998 settlement are in some regards more extensive than has 
to date been recognised, but in other respects are less far-reaching than some of the 
Human Rights Act’s supporters claim. The picture that emerges from our analysis is of 
an intricately woven constitution dependent on devolution arrangements, peace 
agreements, and international relationships.  
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Introduction 
 
Shortfalls in human rights protection within Northern Ireland exacerbated and sustained 
the conflict in Northern Ireland between the 1960s and 1990s, and although human 
rights and equality are concepts ‘central’1 to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA),2 
their place within Northern Ireland’s legal order remains politically contentious. This is a 
volatile context for the UK Government’s proposals to replace the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), the statute which gave effect to some of its most important GFA 
commitments. In the Northern Ireland Assembly Sinn Féin has condemned the policy as 
‘a direct attack on the Good Friday Agreement and the international treaty signed by 
the British and Irish Governments, which gives legal effect to the agreement’.3 The 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), by contrast, has been supportive of HRA repeal, and 
has questioned the connection between the HRA and the GFA. In the words of one of its 
MLAs, claims that the HRA ‘was in some way central either to the Good Friday 
Agreement or to its passage by way of referendum is a high level of revisionist history’.4 
The UK’s international human rights commitments were often prominent and 
controversial during the conflict in Northern Ireland.5 High-profile judgments enforced 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)6 in the teeth of UK security policy.7 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 M. Simpson, ‘The Agreement and Devolved Social Security: A Missed Opportunity for Socio-Economic 
Rights in Northern Ireland?’ (2015) 66 NILQ 105, 106. 
2
 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of Ireland (with annexes) (1998) 2114 UNTS 473. For overview and contextualisation of 
the GFA’s human rights provisions see B. Dickson, ‘The Protection of Human Rights – Lessons from 
Northern Ireland’ [2000] EHRLR 213, C. Harvey, ‘Bringing Humanity Home: A Transformational Human 
Rights Culture for Northern Ireland?’ in A.-M. McAlinden and C. Dwyer, Criminal Justice in Transition: The 
Northern Ireland Context (Hart, 2015) p.47, M. Lamb, ‘Loyalty and Human Rights: Liminality and Social 
Action in a Divided Society’ (2010) 14 IJHR 994 and B. O’Leary, ‘The Nature of the Agreement’ (1999) 22 
Fordham ILJ 1628. 
3
 C. Ruane, MLA, NIA Deb., vol. 105, no. 2, p.41 (1 Jun 2015). 
4
 P. Weir, MLA, NIA Deb., vol. 105, no. 2, p.48 (1 Jun 2015). 
5
 See J. Winter, ‘Abuses and Activism: The Role of Human Rights in the Northern Ireland Conflict and 
Peace Process’ (2013) EHRLR 1.  
6
 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) 213 UNTS 222. 
7
 See Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25, relating to inhuman and degrading treatment of 
republican internees, Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117, relating to police pre-charge 
detention powers in Northern Ireland found to breach the right to liberty and McCann v United Kingdom 
(1996) 21 EHRR 97, relating to breach of the right to life as a result of inadequate planning in an SAS 
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Whereas Nationalists of all stripes regarded the ECHR as a counterweight to UK 
Government policy, many Unionists maintained that the Strasbourg system prioritised 
individual rights at the expense of security considerations and that human rights 
organisations addressed state violations of rights but not those perpetrated by 
paramilitary groups.8 These concerns reinforced doctrinaire Unionist scepticism towards 
rights discourse as being impossible to reconcile with parliamentary sovereignty’s place 
within the UK’s constitutional arrangements.9 Against this backdrop the Ulster Unionist 
Party’s (UUP) acceptance in the GFA that human rights protections had a place within 
the Northern Ireland peace process was all the more significant. Unionists might not 
exactly ‘picked up the human rights ball and [run] with it’,10 but the UUP at least 
acknowledged that rights-based commitments would play a prominent role in the post-
GFA legislative settlement. The DUP, then estranged from the peace process, made no 
such commitment. Although it eventually became reconciled to the process in the St 
Andrews Agreement11 it has ever since sought to dilute human rights components of the 
1998 settlement. In response to its political rival the UUP has resisted any strengthening 
of those human rights protections.12  
The GFA’s human rights provisions were operationalised in domestic law by a 
combination of the HRA and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA), with the latter 
providing ‘in effect a constitution’ for Northern Ireland.13 Proposals for overhaul or 
repeal of the HRA, however, put these protections at risk and threaten the GFA’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
operation in which three Provisional IRA members were shot dead. For an overarching analysis of the 
significance of the ECHR to the conflict in Northern Ireland, see B. Dickson, The European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (OUP, 2010). 
8
 See P. Munce, ‘Unionism and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 1999–2005: Hostility, 
Hubris and Hesitancy’ (2014) 29 Irish Political Studies 194, 205-206. 
9
 See A. Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis (Belfast Press, 2000) 358-359 and C. 
Turner, ‘Political representations of law in Northern Ireland’ [2010] PL 451, 454-456. 
10
 P. Mageean and M. O’Brien, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement’ (1998) 22 Fordham ILJ 1499, 1538. 
11
 Agreement at St Andrews (13 Oct 2006). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-st-andrews-agreement-october-2006. Accessed 25 Jan 
2017. 
12
 See UUP, ‘Ulster Unionist Party Position on a Bill of Rights’ (2011). Available at: 
http://uup.org/assets/images/featured/Ulster%20Unionist%20Party%20Position%20on%20a%20Bill%20o
f%20Rights.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
13
 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32; [2002] NI 390, [11] (Lord Bingham). 
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delicate inter-institutional balance. The proposals have also generated opposition from 
the devolved legislatures of Scotland and Wales, but the prominence of devolution and 
human rights within the GFA raise Northern-Ireland-specific issues.14 The confluence of 
the UK’s GFA obligations, disagreements between the Northern Ireland parties over the 
role of human rights within Northern Ireland’s governance and the complexity of 
relations between Westminster and the Assembly produces an ‘obscure yet systemic 
constitutional conundrum’.15 In this article we unpack the GFA’s complex status as an 
international legal agreement, a peace settlement and a de facto constitutional 
instrument, to enable us to explain the impact of the “Northern Ireland conundrum” on 
UK-wide human rights reform. We first explain how the UK’s obligations under the GFA 
have shaped human rights protections in Northern Ireland. Second, we outline the 
pressure upon the HRA and how its detractors have neglected its relationship with the 
GFA. Third, we assess whether substantive reform of the HRA’s operation in Northern 
Ireland’s law can be reconciled with the terms of the 1998 settlement, and whether the 
UK Government needs, as a matter of constitutional convention, to obtain the Northern 
Ireland Assembly’s consent to reform or repeal the HRA. Fourth, if the UK Government 
acts in contravention of these obligations, we consider the remedies which exist under 
international law. We conclude that a proactive redrawing of the 1998 settlement’s 
human rights and devolution elements with the involvement of the Northern Ireland 
parties offers the only GFA-compliant route forward. If the UK Government seeks to pay 
lip service to these commitments, Ireland’s role as the GFA’s co-guarantor under 
international law assumes particular significance. 
 
Pressure for the HRA’s Repeal  
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 This is demonstrated by the public concerns of the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales for the impact 
of the proposals on the GFA’s arrangements; Scottish Government, ‘News - First Ministers of Scotland and 
Wales Meet’ (3 Jun 2015). Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/First-Ministers-of-Scotland-
and-Wales-meet-1988.aspx. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
15
 P. England and A. Barnett, ‘Why does the UK need a Constitutional Convention? An interview with 
Anthony King’ Our Kingdom (29 Jul 2015). Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/why-does-uk-need-constitutional-
convention-interview-with-anthony-barnett. Accessed 25 Jan 2017.  
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The HRA formed part of a wider package of constitutional reform that was brought 
forward during the first term of Tony Blair’s Labour Government. Labour’s consultation 
process on the Human Rights Bill was framed as “bringing rights home”,16 and, as such, 
the subsequent legislation addressed Labour’s desire to align the UK’s domestic rights 
protections with its international legal obligations under the ECHR.17 Prior to the HRA 
the dualist nature of the UK’s constitutional order meant that, as an unincorporated 
treaty, the ECHR (and with it the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) 
jurisprudence) played a minimal role in domestic civil liberties cases.18 As a result of the 
inability of domestic courts to resolve some rights claims, the pre-HRA system 
contributed to a series of embarrassing adverse ECtHR judgments. As the ECHR’s 
renown grew, an increasing number of applications from the UK were lodged with the 
Strasbourg institutions.19 This traffic emphasised the inefficiency of the UK’s pre-HRA 
arrangements as a system of rights protections.  
The HRA increased the human-rights role of the UK’s domestic courts. Section 6 
imposes a duty upon public authorities to act in a manner compatible with a range of 
incorporated ECHR rights (unless they are otherwise bound by primary legislation) which 
can be enforced by the domestic courts. When a literal interpretation of primary 
legislation permits an abuse of human rights, section 3 obliges judges to reading the 
legislation in a human-rights-compliant manner if it is possible to do so. This provision 
gives Parliament’s blessing to judicial reinterpretation of statute, in theory shielding 
judges from accusations of unwarranted judicial activism.20 And if such a 
reinterpretation is not possible, as it would go against the grain of the legislation,21 
                                                                                                                                                             
16
 J. Straw and P. Boateng, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to Incorporate the European Convention 
on Human Rights into UK Law’ [1997] EHRLR 71. 
17
 J. Straw, MP, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (HMSO, 1997) para.1.11. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf. 
Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
18
 See Lord Donaldson, HL Deb, vol. 560, col. 1154 (25 Jan 1995). 
19
 See Straw (above n.17), para.1.14. 
20
 See Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1 AC 264, [24] (Lord Bingham). 
21
 See Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557, [33] (Lord Nicholls).  
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section 4 allows senior judges to issue a declaration of incompatibility, warning 
Parliament that the legislative provision in question is at serious risk of an adverse ruling 
by Strasbourg. Only 20 such declarations have been made since the HRA’s 
introduction,22 and they can be ignored by the Government and UK Parliament. For 
example, successive Governments have ignored a Declaration of Incompatibility 
concerning the disenfranchisement of prisoners issued in 2007.23 Notwithstanding such 
contentious issues these powers have enabled many clear-cut cases of rights abuses to 
be dealt with within the UK’s domestic legal orders. The years since the HRA entered 
force have consequently seen a decline in the number of adverse Strasbourg judgments 
against the UK, despite a higher number of claims being instituted.24  
Many Conservative politicians and large sections of the press have nonetheless 
consistently condemned ‘Labour’s Human Rights Act’.25 The Conservatives have 
presented the Act as ‘a charter for miscreants to pursue their individualistic interests 
through the courts’,26 even though its use by unpopular or disadvantaged groups within 
society is in keeping with it being a counter-majoritarian constitutional device. They 
have furthermore insisted that section 2’s requirement that the domestic courts take 
into account Strasbourg’s case law in their decisions ‘means problematic Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is often being applied in UK law’27 and challenged domestic courts’ ability 
to reinterpret legislation in a rights-compliant manner as a threat to parliamentary 
sovereignty.28 Following the 2010 general election disagreement within the 
                                                                                                                                                             
22
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Seventh Report: Human Rights Judgments (2015) HL Paper 130/HC 
1088, para.4.1. 
23
 Ibid., para 4.13. 
24
 See A. Donald, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights against the 
UK: Unravelling the Paradox’ in L. Hodson, L. Wicks and K. Ziegler (eds), The UK and European Human 
Rights – A Strained Relationship? (Hart, 2015) p.135. 
25
 D. Cameron, MP, HC Deb, vol. 598, col. 311 (8 July 2015). 
26
 A. Donald and E. Mottershaw, Identifying Human Rights Stories: A Scoping Study (2014) p.3. Available 
at: http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/135318/Identifying-human-rights-stories-July-
2014.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
27
 Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (2014) p.6. Available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf. Accessed 25 
Jan 2017. 
28
 Ibid., p.4. 
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Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government over the HRA’s future led to the 
establishment of a Commission on a Bill of Rights in 2011.29 The Commissioners agreed 
that large sections of the public had an ‘ownership issue’ when it came to human 
rights,30 sustained by misgivings over the role and influence of the ECtHR within the UK’s 
legal systems.31 Some of the Commissioners, however, maintained that the HRA had 
been subjected to a campaign of misinformation32 which had also exaggerated how 
often the ECtHR finds that the UK has breached its ECHR commitments.33 
 
The GFA, Human Rights and International Law 
 
The GFA involved both a settlement between the parties in Northern Ireland and a 
bilateral international treaty between Ireland and the UK. In contemporary peace 
settlements this duality is not unusual, with state-only treaties and settlements having 
given way to inter-linked settlements between state and non-state actors.34 This shift 
therefore reflects broader changes within international law, but the legal status of such 
a peace agreement remains both under-defined and under-explored.35  
 
The GFA as a Bilateral International Treaty 
 
The Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (with annexes) comes firmly within the 
purview of public international law. That both Governments sought to have their 
                                                                                                                                                             
29
 The Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (Dec 2012). Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about
/cbr/uk-bill-rights-vol-1.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
30
 Ibid., vol. 1, pp.28-29. 
31
 Ibid., vol. 1, p.183 (Lord Faulks QC and Jonathan Fisher QC).  
32
 Ibid., vol. 1, p.232 (Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC). 
33
 See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Seventh Report: Human Rights Judgments (2015) HL Paper 
130/HC 1088, para.2.1-2.2. 
34
 A database of contemporary peace agreements is available at, 
http://www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/peace_agreements_database.html. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
35
 C. Bell, ‘Peace agreements: Their nature and legal status’ (2006) 100 AJIL 373, 374. 
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bilateral agreement indexed with the UN Treaty Series demonstrates the intended 
‘international’ character of the Treaty and its binding nature under international law. 
This section of our analysis examines the operation of this Bilateral Treaty under 
customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).36 
Within this framework the legal position of Northern Ireland’s political parties is 
complex. Christine Bell notes that the 1998 Agreement is in fact composed of two 
agreements; one between all of the negotiating and consenting parties at the preceding 
talks (the multi-party agreement), and another between the UK and Ireland (the inter-
state agreement).37 Even though the GFA expressly recognises the interests of the 
negotiating parties38 and Northern Ireland’s inhabitants in the fulfilment of its terms, 
under international law the UK’s obligations are owed to Ireland.39  
The annexed provisions referred to in the GFA’s full title include the Agreement 
Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations. Annexes are considered to be essential 
elements of a treaty and are thus not less binding than the main text unless an 
agreement indicates otherwise, which is not the case with the GFA.40 Within the 
Treaty’s annexed provisions is a section on ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity’, which opens with the parties affirming a partial catalogue of ‘the civil 
rights and the liberties of everyone in the community’. Although this account of 
fundamental rights ‘is purely aspirational as between the political parties’,41 it sets the 
tone for the subsequent provisions which deal with the two governments’ legislative 
commitments:  
                                                                                                                                                             
36
 Both parties are signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, (1980) 1155 UNTS 
331. Although Ireland did not accede until 2006, by the mid-1990s the Vienna Convention had come to be 
regarded as reflective of customary international law; see I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (2
nd
 Ed, Manchester University Press, 1984) pp.5-10 and A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 
(3
rd
 Ed, CUP, 2013) pp.10-11. 
37
 C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (OUP, 2008) p.146. 
38
 Eight Northern Ireland political parties signed up to the GFA (in order of their then vote-share, the 
Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, the 
Progressive Unionist Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Ulster Democratic Party and 
Labour). The Democratic Unionist Party was the only major Northern Ireland Party to oppose the GFA. 
39
 For full details of the complexities of peace agreement construction, see Bell (above n.37), p.144. 
40
 GFA, Article 4. 
41
 Morgan, The Belfast Agreement (above n.9), p.376. 
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The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the 
courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts 
to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.42 … 
The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of 
human rights in its jurisdiction.43 
 
The conformity of Ireland and the UK’s legislative arrangements with the requirements 
of the GFA can therefore be evaluated, within international law, by reference to the 
terms of the Bilateral Treaty and its Annexes.  
The VCLT provides a method of scrutinising the latitude available under the 
Bilateral Treaty.44 Under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, parties are bound to act in 
good faith throughout negotiation and implementation of a treaty,45 which provides the 
basis for assessing parties’ conformity with their treaty obligations.46 Once a treaty is in 
force the state parties, in this case Ireland and the UK, must act in good faith with 
regard to all elements of the Bilateral Treaty. In this context “good faith” depends upon 
the ordinary meaning of a treaty’s terms, considered in light of its object and purpose.47 
To ascertain the object and purpose, parties can use both the wording of a treaty and 
also the preamble and annexes.48 Other relevant materials include instruments made by 
one or more of the parties in the course of concluding a treaty (and which are accepted 
by other parties as related to it). A bad-faith breach of international obligations includes 
the non-performance of specific treaty terms. This would cover a failure by the UK to 
                                                                                                                                                             
42
 GFA, Section 6, para.2. 
43
 Ibid., Section 6, para.9. 
44
 See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3
rd
 Ed, CUP, 2013) and E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of 
Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP, 2011). 
45
 J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 1996) p.39. See also 
O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1991). 
46
 VCLT, Article 26. 
47
 Ibid., Article 31. 
48
 See V. Crnic-Grotic, ‘Object and Purpose of Treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ 
(1997) 7 Asian Yearbook of International Law 141. 
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introduce legislation incorporating the ECHR into Northern Ireland law or the 
subsequent abrogation of those rights. States cannot invoke changes in the political 
complexion of the executive or legislative branches of Government, or reforms required 
by domestic law, to negate their obligation to act in good faith.49  
 
The GFA as a Peace Agreement 
 
State parties to international peace agreements do not merely owe obligations to each 
other, but also to individuals within their jurisdiction.50 Accordingly, action by the UK 
Government which violates the terms of the GFA is not only a breach of the UK’s 
obligations to Ireland, but also a violation of its commitments to the people of Northern 
Ireland. These commitments to individuals tend to be enforced in more diffuse ways 
than would be the case with the commitments to other countries, but in the context of 
the GFA there are a number of local, national and international monitoring bodies and 
organisations that could flag up potential breaches. With regard to the proposed repeal 
of the HRA the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) and the Irish 
Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC) have expressed their concerns in a joint 
statement to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Implementation of the GFA.51 Civil 
society organisations have also issued statements,52 putting on notice international 
bodies such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations’ Human Rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
49
 VCLT, Article 27. 
50
 On these obligations in the context of peace agreements and human rights see respectively Crnic-Grotic 
(above n.48), 145 and H. Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’ in M. Evans (ed), 
International Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2010) 784, pp.800-801. 
51
 Joint Statement of IHREC and NIHRC (25 June 2015). Available at: 
http://www.nihrc.org/news/detail/joint-statement-of-irish-human-rights-and-equality-commission-and-
northern. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. See also, the earlier reaction by, NIHRC, ‘Chief Commissioner Responds 
to Human Rights Proposals’ (12 May 2015). Available at: http://www.nihrc.org/news/detail/chief-
commissioner-responds-to-human-rights-proposals. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
52
 Committee on the Administration of Justice, ‘Tory Plan to Repeal Human Rights Act in NI Would 
Constitute Flagrant Breach of GFA’ (11 May 2015). Available at: http://www.caj.org.uk/contents/1293. 
Accessed 25 Jan 2017; Amnesty International (Ireland), ‘Human Rights Act: Amnesty Warns Repeal Moves 
Could Undermine Peace In Northern Ireland’ (14 May 2015). Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.ie/node/4293. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
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Committee.53 As reform proposals develop the Joint Committee of the NIHRC and the 
IHREC, a cross-border initiative established by the GFA,54 could play a pivotal role.55 
The GFA does not require ECHR-equivalent protections defined by and 
adjudicated within the UK. Instead, reflecting the widespread mistrust of loose talk of 
“British values” in Northern Ireland,56 it explicitly mandates that the ECHR arrangements 
apply generally within Northern Ireland’s legal system. Moreover, in a second lock, the 
GFA envisaged that the Northern Ireland Assembly would be bound to legislate in 
compliance with the ECHR.57 The HRA and the NIA together implement these 
requirements. Under the NIA, the Northern Ireland Assembly can legislate to enhance 
rights protections available within Northern Ireland’s law, but is obliged to respect the 
ECHR standards.58 If Assembly legislation conflicts with the incorporated ECHR rights, 
‘the courts are supreme and are required to strike down all and any “unconstitutional” 
acts of the devolved legislature’.59 This process can be contrasted with the treatment of 
Westminster’s enactments, which continue to shape many areas of law in Northern 
Ireland. In this context the HRA incorporates the same range of ECHR rights, but its 
rights-protection mechanisms, including declarations of incompatibility and the 
reinterpretation clause, have produced ‘a dance of deference between the judiciary and 
legislature but one where ultimately Parliament has the last word’.60  
The resultant human rights protections are not always entirely coherent. The 
Northern Ireland Assembly has the power to alter existing Westminster statutes within 
its areas of competence, at which point the Assembly legislation can be struck down by 
the courts if it is not ECHR compatible. Until the Assembly legislates on one of these 
devolved matters, however, the courts only possess the limited HRA powers with regard 
                                                                                                                                                             
53
 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, ‘UK Commissions Alert United Nations Committee on 
Human Rights Act’ (18 Jun 2015). Available at: http://www.nihrc.org/news/detail/uk-commissions-alert-
united-nations-on-human-rights-act. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
54
 GFA, Section 6, para.10. 
55
 See Bell (above n.37), p.175. 
56
 See C. Harvey, ‘Taking the Next Step? Achieving another Bill of Rights’ [2011] EHRLR 24, 28-29. 
57
 GFA, Strand 1, para.26. 
58
 NIA, s.6(2)(c). 
59
 A. O’Neill, ‘Stands Scotland Where it Did?’ (2006) 57 NILQ 102, 106. 
60
 Ibid., 106. 
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to Westminster statutes. When the courts identify an inadequate protection in an 
existing statute it is for the Northern Ireland Assembly to take legislative steps to rectify 
such provisions. In NIHRC’s Application,61 for example, the Northern Ireland High Court 
declared that the criminal offences relating to abortion operative in Northern Ireland 
Law, as set out under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,62 is incompatible with 
Articles 8 ECHR.63 The High Court could not strike down these provisions, as they are 
contained within an Act of Parliament, but the Assembly (and not Westminster) has the 
primary responsibility for whether and how to amend the legislation.  
This messiness showcases the half-finished nature of Northern Ireland’s peace 
process.64 The Bilateral Treaty and its Annex envisaged an “ECHR-plus” arrangement for 
Northern Ireland, whereby the transitional HRA/NIA arrangements would ultimately be 
superseded by the NIHRC’s drafting of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.65 When the 
Commission’s proposals were debated in 2011, however, the Assembly divided 46-42 
against their adoption, with the Unionist parties combining to block any extension to 
rights protections in Northern Ireland’s law.66 Having received no responses from the 
Northern Ireland parties to subsequent queries on the proposals, in 2012 the Northern 
Ireland Office minister Hugo Swire informed his predecessor Paul Murphy that the 
transitional arrangements put in place after the GFA had ossified: 
 
The House will want to acknowledge the right hon. Gentleman’s part in the Good 
Friday agreement in trying to pursue the Bill of Rights. Frankly, however, that was 
                                                                                                                                                             
61
 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2015] NIQB 96 and [2015] NIQB 102. 
62
 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.58 and 59. See also the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland), 
s.25. 
63
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when he should have pursued it, instead of squandering the good will that he and 
his Government had generated at that time.67 
 
The Stormont House Agreement identifies the stalemate on this issue, noting that ‘there 
is not at present consensus on a Bill of Rights’.68 
In the face of this mixture of apathy and antipathy towards building upon the 
existing human rights arrangements amongst the Northern Ireland parties the UK and 
Irish Governments have reasserted the GFA’s obligations in subsequent negotiations. 
The 2006 St Andrews Agreement reaffirmed the importance of the GFA’s human rights 
provisions69 and in an annex which outlines the UK Government’s obligations relating to 
‘Human Rights, Equality, Victims and Other Issues’, new powers were outlined for the 
NIHRC.70 The unagreed final draft produced by the 2013 Haass talks placed significant 
emphasis on the ECHR with regard to parades.71 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement 
also indicates the ECHR’s continued centrality in the peace process. With regard to 
parades72 and the Historical Investigations Unit,73 compliance with the ECHR is explicitly 
required. Elsewhere, the 2014 Agreement affirmed the need for mechanisms for dealing 
with the past to be ‘human rights compliant’,74 and noted the negotiating parties’ 
obligation to promote human rights in lieu of an agreed Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland.75 These subsequent agreements prevent the DUP from presenting itself as 
consistently opposed to the operation of the ECHR within Northern Ireland’s law. 
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The ECHR and its institutions therefore remain a consistent base line within the 
ongoing peace process, providing an international system for rights protection which 
the parties involved in the peace process can accept.76 The “foreignness” of the ECHR to 
the UK’s legal traditions, which the Conservative leadership finds so suspect, 
underpinned its place within the GFA. The ECHR could not, in 1998 or since, be claimed 
as particular to the narrative of one community within Northern Ireland.77 Repealing the 
HRA risks unpicking this settlement,78 and the UK Bill of Rights Commission 
unsurprisingly recognised considerable reticence within Northern Ireland about the 
need for HRA reform.79 Two Commissioners went so far as to conclude that in Northern 
Ireland ‘the existing arrangements … are not merely tolerated but strongly supported’.80 
When many of the complaints regarding the HRA voiced in other parts of the UK 
concern the rights of prisoners and terrorist suspects it can come as little surprise that 
such issues play very differently in the Northern Ireland context.  
 
The GFA’s relationship with the HRA 
 
The relationship between the GFA and the HRA is indirect. The GFA required that the UK 
incorporate the ECHR into Northern Ireland law, with the substance of this obligation 
being more important than the legislative instrument used to achieve it. At the time of 
the GFA, the parties seem to have considered the HRA’s UK-wide rights protections as 
an interim measure within the peace settlement, to operate while a Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights was being drafted. These factors do not, however, negate the GFA’s 
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applicability to efforts to repeal or reform the HRA. Although the HRA is not explicitly 
mentioned within the GFA, the broader context of a treaty’s operation may be 
considered in assessing the obligations it generates, including pre-existing and 
subsequent practice relevant to the treaty’s application. In April 1998 the negotiating 
parties were on notice of the substantial progress already made towards the HRA’s 
enactment. The White Paper which preceded the Bill explained some key aspects of its 
effect upon on any devolved institutions which might be subsequently be agreed by the 
Northern Ireland parties.81 Moreover, although the HRA does not in fact incorporate the 
ECHR in its entirety,82 the Irish Government was satisfied that it fulfilled the GFA’s 
requirements; ‘[i]n the area of Human Rights, the British Government undertook to 
complete incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights. This was 
achieved through the Human Rights Act, 1998’.83 Joint Irish-UK Government statements 
which acknowledge the HRA’s significance for the GFA are also important. The Joint 
Declaration issued in April 2003, for example, commended the HRA’s operation and 
discussed the further extension of human rights protections.84 
The ECHR-incorporation provision must also be assessed in light of other 
elements of the Bilateral Treaty, including and the UK Government’s broader 
commitments to ensure fair functioning of the criminal justice system85 and the 
requirement upon the Irish Government to examine ‘the question of incorporation of 
the ECHR’ and to ‘ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as 
will pertain in Northern Ireland’.86 Under international law the doctrine of reciprocity 
envisages that a state’s obligations under a treaty are balanced against consequent 
advantages, an outcome that is mirrored by the obligations upon, and advantages 
secured by, other state parties. Reciprocity does not necessarily require that state 
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parties mirror each other’s actions in responding to treaty obligations, but rather 
depends upon whether divergent approaches are proportionate in light of a treaty’s 
aims.87 The Bilateral Treaty envisages different arrangements for implementation of the 
ECHR into law in Northern Ireland and in Ireland. The GFA does not, for example, 
explicitly call for the ECHR’s incorporation into Irish law, meaning that the existence of 
some distinctions in the approaches to rights protection within these jurisdictions do 
not suggest a breakdown in reciprocity. In light of the obligation upon the UK to make 
the ECHR rights justiciable within Northern Ireland’s legal system it nonetheless proved 
difficult for the Irish Government to develop an alternate means by which Ireland could 
satisfy the equivalent-protection requirement.88 Indeed, once the GFA entered into 
effect, the Irish Government explicitly based its plans for the incorporation of the ECHR 
on the HRA model.89 This included the replication of much of the HRA’s architecture in 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act (ECHR Act) 2003.90 The Joint 
Committee’s advice – mandated by the GFA91 – relating to a Charter of Rights for the 
Island of Ireland is also notable for its efforts to map, and demonstrate the 
complementarities of, human rights protections available across the two jurisdictions.92 
Reciprocity is therefore central to Ireland’s objections to any weakening of human rights 
protections through HRA reform.93 
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Options for GFA-compliant HRA Reform 
 
The 2015 Conservative Party Manifesto pledged to ‘scrap the Human Rights Act, and 
introduce a British Bill of Rights’.94 In response to questions on the implications of the 
GFA for the Conservative Government’s plans, the then Justice Minister Dominic Raab 
limply asserted that ‘[w]e will consider the implications of a Bill of Rights on devolution 
as we develop our proposals’.95 His counterpart in the House of Lords maintained that 
the Government ‘will fully engage with the devolved Administrations and the Republic 
of Ireland in view of the relevant provisions of the … Good Friday … Agreement’.96 These 
holding statements indicate that even if HRA reform could satisfy the GFA’s human-
rights provisions, its devolution arrangements provide further challenges for the 
Conservative Government’s agenda. The GFA provided the platform by which power 
could be devolved to Northern Ireland institutions alongside similar transfers to Wales 
and Scotland. Westminster “loaned” law-making powers within certain areas of 
competence to the Northern Ireland Assembly, but maintained its power to legislate in 
respect of devolved matters.97 The UK Parliament’s sovereignty has, nonetheless, been 
tempered as a matter of practice when it seeks to legislate in devolved areas by the 
operation of constitutional conventions. HRA reform is therefore a complex proposition 
for a Conservative Government with a slender Commons majority. The repeated delays 
in the publication of a draft Bill of Rights point to ministers wrestling with the difficulties 
posed by unpicking one element from the 1998 constitutional reforms. In this section 
we examine the problems facing different versions of HRA reform in turn. 
 
Cosmetic Change to the HRA 
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The Conservative Government could give effect to its headline proposal to scrap the 
HRA by simply rebadging the legislation and maintaining comparable levels of rights 
protection within UK law. Under this approach the HRA would be replaced with a 
“British Bill of Rights” which retains the ECHR rights incorporated into the UK’s legal 
orders, the duty of domestic courts to have regard to Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
right of individual petition to Strasbourg. Even though such a measure would ‘not 
appear to depart significantly from the Human Rights Act’,98 some question whether it 
would satisfy the GFA’s human-rights obligations. The GFA has been said to the 
continuation of the HRA in its present form,99 on the basis that the parties were aware 
that the UK Parliament was working on this legislation at the time of the negotiations.100 
Indeed, the Irish Government has maintained that the UK’s obligations were ‘given 
[effect] in the 1998 UK Human Rights Act’.101 The HRA explicitly extends to Northern 
Ireland, whereas Wales and Scotland are not mentioned in the text (being covered by 
implication).102 The GFA’s terms, however, merely mandate that the UK Government 
must ‘complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’.103 It does not specify the HRA as the vehicle by which this incorporation 
is achieved. Moreover, given the NIHRC’s remit under the GFA to draft a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland,104 the negotiating parties must have intended that the HRA, if 
enacted, would be a placeholder measure, which would assume at most a background 
role when a Northern Ireland-specific Bill of Rights came into effect. 
Compliance with the GFA thus depends upon the degree to which the ECHR is 
embedded within Northern Ireland’s law, not the legislative tool used to fulfil this task. 
Nonetheless, labelling any replacement for the HRA a “British” Bill of Rights would be 
loaded with unwelcome symbolism in the Northern-Ireland context. Throughout the 
GFA, ‘British’ and ‘Irish’ are used to distinguish the different traditions within Northern 
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Ireland.105 Independent of the substance of such legislation, a “British” Bill of Rights 
would inevitably be perceived as partisan in its operation. Describing the new legislation 
as a “United Kingdom Bill of Rights” avoids this specific incongruence with the GFA’s 
language, but any national appellation is likely to generate tension. Although an entirely 
cosmetic change to the title of the legislation would thus not fall foul of the GFA, even 
such a minimal reform could produce a destabilising effect within Northern Ireland.  
The conformity of any more substantive HRA reforms with the GFA depends 
upon the impact of specific reforms on the degree of ECHR incorporation within 
Northern Ireland’s law. The Conservatives’ most prominent proposal has been to ‘curtail 
the role of the European Court of Human Rights’106 within the UK’s domestic legal 
systems by revisiting the HRA’s requirement that domestic courts should take into 
account interpretations of human rights adopted by Strasbourg.107 This could involve 
reworking this HRA provision to make it explicit that the Strasbourg’s human rights 
jurisprudence is purely ‘advisory’ in character.108 As scope already exists under the HRA 
for the UK’s courts to adopt interpretations of rights which diverge from the position 
taken by Strasbourg, such a reform could therefore be seen to be cosmetic in character, 
and might not undermine the UK’s GFA commitments.109 The Conservatives have, 
however, also suggested weakening the courts’ power under the HRA to reinterpret 
legislation so far as possible to conform with human rights,110 on the basis that this 
power allows judges to adopt unnatural readings of a statute which were not intended 
by Parliament.111 They also propose introducing a seriousness threshold for instituting 
human-rights claims, which ‘could undermine the commitment of the UK to facilitate 
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direct access to the courts and to remedies for breaches of the Convention’.112 In light of 
the fact that the powers Northern Ireland’s courts possess to address statutory human 
rights breaches under the HRA are already weak, any further diminution would, in many 
cases, render human-rights protections nugatory.  
Reforms which adjust, but maintain, the relationship between Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and Northern Ireland’s law, can be subjected to a three-step touchstone 
test for GFA compatibility. HRA-reform proposals must maintain the level of ECHR 
‘incorporation’, ‘direct access to the courts’ and the ‘power for the courts to overrule 
Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency’ with the ECHR.113 These criteria, 
subject to broader devolution and political considerations, might therefore permit some 
weakening of the link to Strasbourg jurisprudence. Legislative limitations curtailing 
particular ECHR rights or restricting their application to certain groups would be 
contrary to the Agreement. This would include, for instance, the exclusion of prisoners 
or the armed forces from the ambit of domestic human rights protections or the 
restriction of the domestic operation of Article 8 ECHR. Even cosmetic changes to the 
current HRA scheme would thus be subject to GFA restrictions. Beyond such limited 
changes, proposals which explicitly prevent the UK courts from relying upon 
Strasbourg’s jurisprudence would have a substantial impact on human rights in 
Northern Ireland, and therefore warrant separate consideration. 
 
Breaking the Link with the ECHR Institutions 
 
A mere rebadging exercise, tweaking particular aspects of how the ECHR is applied 
within UK law, hardly corresponds to the venom of Conservative criticisms of the HRA. If 
that is all that is in the legislative pipeline, some have questioned whether a British Bill 
of Rights is necessary at all.114 Throughout David Cameron’s premiership the 
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Conservatives therefore toyed with more extensive proposals, in particular sweeping 
away the HRA’s requirement that UK courts take ECtHR jurisprudence into account as a 
means of freeing them from their supposed subservience to Strasbourg.115 Of particular 
concern for the Conservatives has been the Court’s ‘living instrument’ doctrine,116 by 
which some ECHR rights have been given more extensive interpretations than were 
envisaged when the ECHR was drafted. By ‘break[ing] the formal link between the 
British Courts and the European Court of Human Rights’117 the Conservatives would 
prevent Strasbourg’s extensions from being applied directly by UK courts. Moreover, 
David Cameron’s team believed that once this step was taken the ECtHR would be 
obliged to grant the UK a more substantial ‘margin of appreciation’118 when subsequent 
legislation explicitly sought to restrict the operation of the ECHR’s qualified rights. 
The most direct way to achieve this aim would be for a British Bill of Rights to 
maintain in UK domestic law enumerated rights which are comparable to, or even 
mirror, those listed in the 1950 Convention, but to explicitly curtail the application of 
Strasbourg’s subsequent interpretations of these rights by the UK courts. Any such 
reform, however, threatens the UK’s compliance with the GFA. The GFA expressly 
stipulates that ‘[t]here will be safeguards to ensure [that] … neither the Assembly nor 
public bodies can infringe [the ECHR]’.119 In this context the ECHR’s provisions cannot be 
divorced from their interpretations by Strasbourg. The UK is obliged to respond to 
ECtHR judgments which apply to the UK,120 and many significant ECtHR judgments 
develop the interpretation of particular rights and therefore matter for UK law even if 
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the UK is not a party.121 The Court has confirmed that it will consider whether national 
authorities have taken into account its body of jurisprudence when determining 
whether they have taken requisite measures in response to a ruling.122 
For all the packaging of this proposal as a sweeping change, when confronted 
with concerns based upon the GFA Conservative ministers solemnly intoned that ‘the 
protection of human rights is a key part of the Belfast agreement, and our Bill of Rights 
will continue to protect the rights set out in the European Convention on Human 
Rights’.123 The aim would seem to be to present these proposals as maintaining 
sufficient incorporation for GFA compliance. Despite such efforts to allay concerns, 
restrictions upon the Northern Ireland courts’ ability to take account of Strasbourg case 
law would create a three-fold problem for GFA compliance. First, by removing their 
ability to consider the jurisprudence, such reforms would limit the extent to which the 
ECHR is incorporated. Second, such a measure would curtail the Northern Ireland 
courts’ ability to assess whether actions by public bodies and Assembly legislation are 
ECHR-compliant. Third, such a restriction would invariably disconnect between the 
interpretations of ECHR rights adopted by Strasbourg and Northern Ireland’s courts. 
Such differences would likely spur an increase in complaints against the UK at the 
ECtHR. Such reforms would therefore substantially weaken human rights protections 
within the law of Northern Ireland, to the point where it could no longer be said to 
involve a meaningful incorporation of the ECHR rights.  
 
Post-Brexit: More Radical Potenetial Departures from the 1998 Settlement 
 
The proposed reforms to the UK’s domestic human rights arrangements evaluated 
above both involve enacting a British Bill of Rights which provides for a broadly 
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equivalent statement of rights to those contained within the HRA. And under David 
Cameron’s leadership the Conservatives did indeed appear committed to replacing the 
HRA with a rights instrument ‘rooted in our values’124 and which placed the original 
ECHR’s text ‘at the heart of our plan’.125 For as long as the UK remains part of the 
European Union (EU) the UK is effectively tied into the ECHR as a baseline requirement 
for EU membership.126 For all that David Cameron saw electoral advantage in refusing to 
rule out the UK’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe during the 2015 UK General 
Election campaign,127 after the election reverted to a position of seeking ‘to pass a 
British Bill of Rights, which we believe is compatible with our membership of the Council 
of Europe’.128 David Cameron thus seemed to tacitly accept that, for all his critique of 
contemporary pan-European human rights protections, such proposals marked the limit 
of achievable human rights reforms. With Brexit, however, this major obstacle to more 
far-reaching reforms is removed. His successor, Theresa May, can therefore 
contemplate acting on her confirmed animus against an ECHR system which ‘can bind 
the hands of parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, makes us less secure by 
preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals, and does nothing to change 
the attitudes of governments like Russia’s when it comes to human rights’.129 Such 
action could ultimately include repeal of the HRA without replacement and even the 
UK’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe. 130  
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Any attempt to return to civil liberties along pre-HRA lines, by which individuals 
were supposedly free to act in any way which does not contravene the law,131 would 
undoubtedly conflict with the GFA and would run into the same devolution challenges 
that would hamper major changes to the HRA’s core provisions. The 2014 Conservative 
Party Policy Paper on Human Rights spun a line that ‘over the centuries through our 
Common Law tradition, the UK’s protection of human rights has always been grounded 
in real circumstance’.132 Post-Brexit, Parliamentarians concerned about the threat to 
human rights protections in Northern Ireland have been fobbed off with condescending 
bon mots about the UK’s glorious tradition of liberties stretching back to Magna 
Carta.133 But this tradition did little to curtail the litany of human-rights abuses 
perpetrated by the police, military and security agencies in the course of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland.134 The common law may well have moved on since 1998, with an 
increasing number of appellate judgments emphasising fundamental rights inherent 
within the common law,135 but this does not substitute for the ECHR’s catalogue of 
enumerated rights. 
The ECHR system has also moved on since 1998. Conterminous with the 
enactment of the HRA, Strasbourg’s jurisdiction to hear individual claims became 
compulsory.136 If the UK wished to remain within the ECHR without a general 
incorporation of the ECHR rights into domestic law, it could not do so on the basis of the 
temporary grants of jurisdiction to hear individual petitions it had employed into the 
1990s. These temporary grants were often used by states to exert leverage over the 
Court, allowing governments to threaten a state’s withdrawal of individual access to the 
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Court if its judgments became too uncomfortable.137 But even if individual petition, and 
by extension the oversight of the Strasbourg Court, are now fixed features of the ECHR 
system, this does not satisfy the GFA’s requirement for incorporated ECHR rights which 
can be employed before the Northern Ireland courts.  
Rather than attempting to turn back the clock to before 1998, the Conservative 
Government could contemplate withdrawing from the ECHR, an outcome supported by 
many prominent supporters of Brexit.138 In her campaign to become Conservative 
leader Theresa May recognised that she could not at present gain parliamentary support 
for UK withdrawal from the ECHR, and made it clear that she would not pursue such a 
policy in the remainder of the current Parliament.139 Moreover, Brexit will undoubtedly 
place a considerable strain on the UK’s administrative resources, potentially 
marginalising other major reform projects. This does not, however, preclude a more a 
much more aggressive push against the UK’s membership of the Council of Europe being 
part of the next Conservative manifesto. Theresa May has already flagged up 
withdrawal from the ECHR as a priority once the legislative heavy-lifting of disentangling 
the UK from EU law is at least under way.140 Such a platform would be intuitively 
attractive to many Conservatives, even at the price of further destabilising politics in 
Northern Ireland. Withdrawal could not, however, be reconciled with the GFA. The Irish 
Government has insisted that ending the ECHR’s incorporation within Northern Ireland 
law would contravene the Bilateral Treaty. Frances Fitzgerald, the Minister for Justice 
and Equality, pointedly informed the UK Government that ‘while a domestic Bill of 
Rights could complement incorporation, it could not replace it’.141 The GFA does not 
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directly protect the HRA, but UK cannot simply abandon its ECHR commitments and 
claim to remain GFA compliant. 
 
A Northern Ireland-Specific Solution 
 
The foregoing analysis indicates that if the UK Government is to comply with the GFA’s 
prominent ECHR-incorporation provisions its options for HRA reform are limited. But 
because the GFA’s obligations apply specifically to Northern Ireland’s law, one option 
could be for Westminster to produce a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and then proceed 
with human-rights reform without concern for the GFA’s requirements. We must 
therefore evaluate whether GFA compliance could be achieved by establishing a 
separate regime covering Northern Ireland’s ‘particular … situation’,142 and the 
difficulties inherent in establishing such distinct arrangements. Early Conservative Party 
thinking on human-rights reform proceeded on the basis that developing unique 
provisions for Northern Ireland would address the GFA’s requirements. As Dominic 
Grieve acknowledged in 2009, ‘I can see no reason … why our UK Bill of Rights should 
not make special provision for Northern Ireland to reflect its need to tackle the 
particular circumstances there’.143 Up until 2012 the Conservatives remained breezily 
confident that some Northern Ireland provisions could be ‘tagged on’ to UK-wide 
reform.144 Since then, however, increasing use of the ill-considered “British Bill of 
Rights” epithet has been accompanied by equivocation over special arrangements for 
Northern Ireland.145  
In legal terms a separate regime for Northern Ireland provides the most direct 
means of tackling GFA concerns. Although Christine Bell has argued that the GFA’s 
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reciprocity requirements oblige the maintenance of ECHR incorporation on a UK-wide 
basis, and not simply in Northern Ireland,146 the Bilateral Treaty explicitly compares 
standards of rights protection between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Adjustments in the 
standard of human rights protections in other parts of the UK cannot, of themselves, be 
taken to breach the requirements of reciprocity under international law.147 For its part, 
the Irish Government has been keen to kick start progress towards a Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights, lamenting the absence of a renewed commitment within the Stormont 
House Agreement.148 If it was to be GFA-compliant, however, a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights could not restrict the ECHR’s incorporation within Northern Ireland’s law. The 
sections of the GFA which discuss a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights maintain that no 
matter what ‘supplementary’ protections might result, the baseline of the relationship 
between the law of Northern Ireland and the ECHR must be maintained.149 As a result, 
even setting aside the political difficulties with instituting a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights, this solution would actually foreclose certain options for human rights reform. So 
as not to reduce current human rights protections the Northern Ireland courts would 
have to retain their ability to take account of Strasbourg jurisprudence, to reinterpret 
provisions in a rights-compliant manner and to issue declarations of incompatibility with 
regard to UK Acts of Parliament which apply within Northern Ireland law. Adopting an 
approach which tied Northern Ireland into the ECHR would also stymie any effort by the 
UK Government to withdraw from the Strasbourg system.  
 
The Northern Ireland Assembly’s Consent to HRA Reform 
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Unless the Northern Ireland Assembly consents to any of the above range of human 
rights reforms their imposition from Westminster would also undermine the 
institutional arrangements established on the basis of the GFA. Lord Sewel, a minister 
responsible for piloting the 1998 devolution legislation through the House of Lords, 
explained that once devolution was operational a constitutional convention would 
operate to ensure that ‘Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to 
devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’.150 The 
same convention also covers Wales and Northern Ireland.151 If we confine “normally” in 
the above statement to permitting Westminster to legislate without consent in 
response to an emergency, when the UK Government proposes legislation which 
touches on devolved matters then the Sewel Convention requires that such a change be 
assented to by the Assembly by means of a Legislative Consent Motion.152 Under the 
Assembly’s standing orders Westminster legislation which covers a “devolution matter” 
includes any measure which touches upon an area of competence transferred to 
Northern Ireland’s institutions or which attempts to change the Assembly’s legislative 
competence.153 The Assembly’s competence is bounded by human rights 
considerations, as stipulated by the GFA.154 The NIA denies the Assembly competence to 
make laws which are incompatible with incorporated ECHR rights.155 Its interpretation 
clause moreover specifies that the concept of incorporated ECHR rights ‘has the same 
meaning as in the Human Rights Act 1998’, tying together the statutes.156  
                                                                                                                                                             
150
 Lord Sewel, HL Deb, vol. 592, col. 791 (21 Jul 1998). 
151
 The Convention was adopted within the Memorandum of Understanding on relations between the 
UK’s devolved and central institutions; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Memorandum of 
Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the UK Government and the Devolved 
Administrations (December 2001) Cm 5240, para.13. See Murphy (above n.112), 336-337. 
152
 See Commission on a Bill of Rights (above n.29), vol. 1, p.251 (A. Speaight QC). 
153
 Northern Ireland Assembly, Standing Order 42A, para.10. On this issue, see R (on the application of 
Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [140]. 
154
 GFA, Strand 1, para.5 and para.26. 
155
 NIA, s.6(2)(c). 
156
 Ibid., s.98(1). 
29 
 
Assuming that the Assembly is functioning,157 this convention could be 
interpreted as meaning that any amendment to the HRA which would alter the 
competences of the Assembly and therefore trigger the need for a Legislative Consent 
Motion.158 This requirement would appear to pose severe difficulties for a UK 
Government intent on achieving HRA reform in a manner which respects this 
constitutional commitment. Even if the Unionist parties combined to provide a majority 
in the Assembly in support of a Legislative Consent Motion, the NIA also contains 
consociationalism provisions intended to prevent measures passed with the backing of 
parties representing one community from having a disproportionate impact upon the 
other community’s interests.159 The Nationalist parties could use these provisions to 
trigger a Petition of Concern,160 requiring that any Legislative Consent Motion 
authorising HRA reform receive cross-community support. By this route they could 
refuse Assembly consent for any reform which they considered a threat to the GFA’s 
human-rights obligations. The UK Government has hitherto accepted that unilateral 
action on an issue so bound up in the GFA would challenge the very nature of the 1998 
settlement; ‘We take our responsibilities under the Belfast agreement very seriously; we 
will not do anything to undermine it and we will work with parties to that end’.161 
Moreover, successive Northern Ireland Secretaries have insisted that any progress on a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights requires the Assembly’s consent: 
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[A] legislative consent motion must be passed by the assembly in circumstances 
where the government brings forward any legislation at Westminster such as a Bill 
of Rights which will have a significant impact on devolved policy. … The British 
government is happy to move, but there is no point in moving until we have 
achieved some sort of consensus which is very much lacking at the moment.162 
 
This self-imposed commitment to consensus163 would appear to stymie the use of a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights as a way out of any impasse on HRA reform. It may well 
be that the Conservatives come to regret their studied disinterest in the NIHRC’s 
proposals. 
These bulwarks against imposed reform, however, appear to rest upon 
legislative consent as a constitutional convention as opposed to constitutional law.164 In 
the Miller case165 the UK Supreme Court recently ruled on the question of whether the 
Northern Ireland Assembly would, as a matter of law, have to issue a Legislative Consent 
Motion to allow the UK Parliament to legislate to begin the process of Brexit. As the 
Assembly’s legislative competence is bounded by EU law’s requirements in similar 
fashion to the provisions relating to the ECHR, the Court’s ruling is relevant to whether 
the HRA could be repealed without the Assembly’s consent.166 In Miller all eleven 
Supreme Court Justices agreed that the courts could not enforce the convention that 
Westminster would gain a Legislative Consent Motion from the devolved legislatures 
before legislating to authorise the commencement of Brexit negotiations.167 In the 
words of the majority judgment, conventions can ‘play a fundamental role in the 
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operation of our constitution’ but the policing of their scope and operation ‘does not lie 
within the constitutional remit of the judiciary’.168 Put another way, acting without 
Assembly consent could be unconstitutional, but it would not be illegal.169  
We nonetheless maintain that a direct analogy between the Assembly’s ability to 
consent to EU law and ECHR law is, in important respects, inappropriate. Miller 
emphasised that although the GFA assumed the UK’s continuing membership of the EU, 
it did not require it.170 The ECHR, however, has a much stronger basis in the GFA and 
might be said to cross the line from ‘assumed’ to ‘required’. The Supreme Court further 
asserted that the Assembly does not have a parallel legislative competence in relation to 
Brexit on the basis that ‘the EU constraints are a means by which the UK Parliament and 
government make sure that the devolved democratic institutions do not place the 
United Kingdom in breach of its EU law obligations’.171 The basis for the ECHR 
constraints upon the Assembly could not be characterised in the same way; they were 
imposed to reflect specific GFA commitments.172 If the GFA, and not parliamentary 
sovereignty, is accepted as the ‘ultimate political fact’173 underpinning Northern 
Ireland’s system of governance then even after Miller it remains arguable that as a 
matter of constitutional law there are some measures that Parliament cannot enact 
without the Assembly’s consent. Thus the Supreme Court’s judgment does not foreclose 
the possibility of litigation to uphold the need for the Assembly’s consent should 
Parliament attempt to redraw central features of the GFA settlement, such as its human 
rights arrangements. It does, however, suggest that if the UK Government is intent on 
forcing through human-rights reform in spite of constitutionally significant (but arguably 
purely political) requirements for Assembly consent, then Ireland’s ability to challenge 
any breach of the GFA as a breach of international law will take centre stage. 
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International Law’s Impact upon HRA Reform 
 
Modifying the GFA 
 
An alternate way to circumvent the GFA’s restrictions would be for the UK Government 
to seek to renegotiate of the settlement’s human rights provisions. Treaties are, of 
course, not set in stone. Successor treaties, treaty amendments, engagement of 
severability provisions and fundamental changes in circumstance all provide recognised 
means by which the binding character of some or all of a treaty like the Bilateral Treaty 
can be altered. This legal route, however, does not take account of the political context 
of Northern Ireland’s peace process. 
The first issue which arises concerns the relationship between successor and 
predecessor treaties.174 Although the Irish Government was present at the negotiation 
of the 2006 St Andrews Agreement, the ultimate Agreement was concluded between 
the UK Government and the Northern Ireland parties. The Irish Government is not a 
party to this Agreement. However, in being present, Ireland would be regarded as 
having acquiesced to the amendments made to the GFA arrangements. Annex B of the 
St Andrews Agreement, regarding human rights, specifically references the HRA, but 
does not mention the ECHR,175 exemplifying the degree to which the HRA has come in 
practice to underpin the human-rights aspects of the 1998 settlement. The language of 
Annex B appears to follow the GFA in regarding the ECHR as a human-rights baseline 
and that in Northern Ireland a form of “ECHR-plus” would be employed in the 
development of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights by the Bill of Rights Forum. The St 
Andrews Agreement can be understood as subsequent practice by the UK and Irish 
Governments in implementing the Bilateral Treaty. As such, it seems to reinforce the 
ECHR’s within Northern Ireland’s system of governance, rather than undermining it.  
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Article 59 of the VCLT allows treaties to be suspended or terminated, which as a 
matter of law remains an option available to both Governments.176 The VCLT also allows 
for successive treaties, an option which is particularly straightforward with regard to 
bilateral treaties and a route which the Irish and UK Governments have employed since 
the establishment of the Free State in 1921.177 In the circumstance of suspension or 
termination, the Bilateral Treaty including the Annex would be suspended or 
terminated, but the GFA as a political agreement within Northern Ireland would stand. 
Its political position would instead become a UK constitutional issue between the 
devolved Government and Westminster rather than a question of international law. In 
the circumstance of a successive treaty (as with the Anglo-Irish Agreement before) the 
Bilateral Treaty and Annex could be terminated between the two Governments and 
replacement terms agreed between the two parties. Nonetheless, it is extremely 
unlikely that such a change would be attempted without the consent of Northern 
Ireland’s political parties. 
The VCLT allows for the amendment of treaties. One of the issues arising from this 
option is that it is the Annex to the Treaty that requires amendment rather than the 
main part of the document. This Annex was of course subject to intense negotiation in 
Northern Ireland and thus, whilst international law would allow for its amendment, the 
political viability of such a course of action is a separate issue (in this regard, 
amendment would take place in the context of the emergent lex post bellum or lex 
pacificatoria).178 This pre-supposes that the Irish Government would be open to an 
amendment that would change obligation of the ‘ECHR-plus’ protection to one of 
‘ECHR-minus’. The Irish Government, however, regards the human rights provisions of 
the GFA as clear and unchanged:  
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[A] strong human rights framework, including external supervision by the 
European Court of Human Rights, has been an essential part of the peace process 
and anything that undermines this, or is perceived to undermine this, could have 
serious consequences for the operation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.179 
 
As a guarantor of the GFA, the Irish Government has affirmed its responsibility to 
safeguard its institutions and principles.180 In clearly voicing its intention to carry out this 
responsibility the Irish Government is positioning itself as an essential component in any 
discussion on reform or repeal of the current arrangements.  
 
Negotiating a New British-Irish Human Rights Protocol 
 
If the UK Government is not to fall foul of the obligations owed to Ireland under 
international law with regard to Northern Ireland and human rights in the course of 
substantive human-rights reform, it will have to engage in a proactive process of treaty 
renegotiation with regard to the 1998 settlement. The precedent for this process came 
in 2004, when, as a result of the citizenship referendum in Ireland, changes to Ireland’s 
Constitution instituted in response to the GFA181 were in part reversed. To maintain its 
international obligations, the Irish Government first sought the UK Government’s 
agreement that ‘that this proposed change to the Constitution is not a breach of the … 
Agreement or the continuing obligation of good faith in the implementation of the said 
Agreement’.182  
Although simple in legal terms, negotiating a new British-Irish Human Rights 
Protocol would undoubtedly face serious challenges in light of the fact that the 1998 
Agreement is not a simple bi-lateral treaty. Both Governments would operate under the 
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pressure of perceptions from various constituencies, notably the Northern Ireland 
parties.183 The Irish Government’s actions in renegotiations would attract pressure from 
the public in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. A key element of the GFA 
settlement has been the inclusion of Northern Ireland’s politicians in British-Irish 
negotiations which affect the region. In 2004, however, a British-Irish Interpretive 
Declaration was negotiated in the absence of the Northern Ireland parties, and over the 
opposition of the SDLP and Sinn Féin. At the time, the SDLP’s Mark Durkan warned that 
‘[t]he DUP can now cite a precedent which they can say shows you can unilaterally 
change, vary and alter the agreement, even going to its constitutional core’.184 To this 
warning can be added concerns over the Interpretive Declaration’s significance in 
international law, for it suggests that the Northern Ireland parties can be excluded from 
any subsequent renegotiation process between the two governments. Negotiations on a 
new British-Irish Human Rights Protocol, however, would be unlikely to follow this 
pattern. On an issue as central to the GFA as general human rights commitments, side-
lining Northern Ireland’s democratically-elected representatives could not be 
countenanced by the Irish Government. This brings us back to the stalemate between 
Northern Ireland’s parties on issues of human rights, best illustrated by the lack of 
progress towards a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in the Stormont House Agreement.185 
There seems no obvious route towards cross-party agreement. As such, although 
renegotiating the GFA’s human-rights elements is a necessary precursor to altering the 
UK’s obligations, the place of Northern Ireland’s parties in such negotiations generates 
near insurmountable political difficulties. 
 
Challenging Unilateral Action by the UK 
 
While it is possible to pass a subsequent treaty, or to amend or sever the existing 
Bilateral Treaty’s provisions, it is not possible for the UK to do so unilaterally. Any 
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modifications by the UK must be done through re-negotiation with the Irish 
Government and, given the circumstances of the GFA, in tandem with the parties in 
Northern Ireland. It would be near-impossible to reopen the human rights element of 
the 1998 settlement in isolation from other aspects of the Agreement. If, in spite of 
these obligations the UK did proceed to act unilaterally, several options would become 
available to Ireland under international law and the VLCT.186 If it considered the 
unilateral act to be a material breach, which is a valid interpretation of such action, 
Ireland would be entitled to terminate or suspend the whole or part of the treaty. 
Although the GFA’s Bilateral Treaty includes no dispute settlement clause, several 
options remain open to Ireland if it believes the UK to be in violation of the Agreement.  
One of the more obvious options, an action before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), does not appear to be a possibility. Both states, in making their declarations 
of compulsory jurisdiction (the formal recognition of the Court’s authority), have 
included qualifications that could be interpreted as excluding the other. The Irish 
Government has the most evident exclusion, which allows for all disputes to be heard at 
the International Court except those that arise between it and the UK with regard to 
Northern Ireland. The UK’s declaration is slightly more open in that it states ‘any dispute 
with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the 
Commonwealth’.187 Whether the UK’s exclusion would include Ireland is, however, 
questionable. The Commonwealth is a sui generis organisation and if this clause were to 
be extensively interpreted it would include a vast number of countries which were once 
part of the British Empire. Which countries are considered a part of the 
‘Commonwealth’ changes depending on the definition one uses. One definition of the 
Commonwealth can be interpreted to exclude those countries which were not part of 
the organisation in 1949 when the London Declaration made all member states ‘free 
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and equal’.188 Ireland had passed the Republic of Ireland Act 1948 which came into 
effect 10 days before the London Declaration, and thus it had left the Commonwealth 
before its modern incarnation. In any case, however, the Irish Government’s declaration 
does appear to exclude an ICJ case with the UK regarding Northern Ireland. Although 
the Irish Government could choose to revoke its declaration, the UK could argue that it 
relied on the Irish Government’s declaration in its dealings with the country including in 
respect of the GFA. This position is made more difficult by the date of Ireland’s 
declaration of compulsory jurisdiction, which took place after the GFA negotiations. 
Beyond the ICJ, remedies for breach may be available through the law of state 
responsibility. Though the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts have not been adopted as a treaty, they 
are widely regarded as reflecting binding customary international law.189 An 
internationally wrongful act can be an act or omission which is attributable to a state 
and which constitutes a breach of its international obligation. The internal conditions or 
domestic law of a country are irrelevant to a determination of a breach.190 The Bilateral 
Treaty imposes international obligations upon the UK, and any of the options for 
human-rights reform which were indicated above as breaching these GFA obligations, 
would trigger the Law of State Responsibility. Under international law, the injury to 
Ireland would include both material and moral damage, which are subject to reparations 
including restitution, compensation and or satisfaction.191 If a state refuses to 
acknowledge its breach or provide reparations the injured state can ultimately invoke 
proportionate ‘countermeasures’.192 Therefore, although it is difficult to imagine such a 
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collapse in relations between the UK and Ireland, if the UK did unilaterally abrogate its 
GFA commitments international law provides Ireland with options for recourse.193  
 
Conclusion 
 
Some unalloyed vision of national sovereignty underpins both Brexit and the 
Conservative Party’s aversion to the ECHR. Its proposals have given little consideration 
to Northern Ireland, seemingly proceeding on Anthony King’s ill-judged dictum that 
‘[w]hat happens in Northern Ireland scarcely affects British constitutional development; 
constitutional development in Britain scarcely affects what happens in Northern 
Ireland’.194 Our account has challenged the wishful thinking inherent in the notion that 
the arrangements covering Northern Ireland can be conceptually detached from the 
remainder of the UK constitution; there can be no “British” Bill of Rights without 
consideration of its application to Northern Ireland. The GFA, moreover, was not a 
simple Bilateral Treaty between the UK and Ireland. As the primary instrument enabling 
Northern Ireland’s peace settlement it became part of the ‘metaconstitutional 
discourse’ between the two countries.195 As such, the GFA was rooted in the ECHR and 
EU as legal orders which bind both the UK and Ireland.196 Of the two, however, the 
ECHR’s roots are by far the deeper, and are all but impossible to unearth if the UK 
Government remains ‘committed to honouring the Belfast Agreement’ and to ensuring 
that ‘our proposals for a Bill of Rights are compatible with it.’197 Any meaningful attempt 
at UK-wide human-rights reform will undoubtedly collide with the UK’s obligations 
under the GFA. As a consequence, the Conservative Government will have to 
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compromise the vision of a British Bill of Rights which it has sold to its supporters, or be 
prepared to flout the Agreement’s terms. 
 
